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The Power of Words: A Comment on Hamann and
Vogel’s Evidence-Based Jurisprudence Meets Legal
Linguistics—Unlikely Blends Made in Germany
Mark C. Suchman *
By offering an international and interdisciplinary point of comparison,
Hamann and Vogel demonstrate that current American forays into
corpus-based legal scholarship reflect only a small sliver of the full range
of possibilities for such research. This Comment considers several key
branching points that may lie ahead, as the nascent literature begins to
mature. In particular, the Comment examines two vexing ambiguities
in the corpus-linguistic agenda: the first centers on the ambiguous
meaning of legal “empiricism”; the second, on the ambiguous relationship
between words and actions. To achieve its full potential, legal corpus
linguistics will need to move beyond mere description, to identify
patterned configurations, to interpret cultural meanings, and to trace
causal processes. To do so effectively, researchers will need to look beyond
legal corpora alone, to explore the varied and complex relationships
between texts and acts, and between legal institutions and the
surrounding society.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Hanjo Hamann and Friedemann Vogel provide a useful reminder
that legal corpus linguistics is a global product, not so much made in
America 1 as blended and packaged for local tastes from ingredients
sourced through a long international supply chain. Not being a corpus
linguistics scholar, I cannot judge the provenance or quality of those
ingredients. And not being a comparative law scholar, I cannot judge
their suitability for local German tastes. However, as an empirical law
and society researcher and a methodological omnivore, I can certainly
appreciate an intriguing imported brew, even one unfamiliar to my
palate and hard to find in my neighborhood. 2
I offer the foregoing disclaimer and appreciation as a preface
because my comments below center less on the Hamann and Vogel
essay, per se, than on the broader enterprise of legal corpus
linguistics—and the themes of this symposium—as refracted through
the Hamann and Vogel article’s international and interdisciplinary
lens. As a methodology, American legal corpus linguistics is still in its
infancy, and like most infants, it is fascinated by the shiny objects
closest at hand. But Hamann and Vogel’s German comparison
foreshadows some of the challenges, anxieties, and identity crises that
legal corpus linguistics will (or should) face as the field comes into its
adolescence. My commentary focuses on two such challenges in
particular, both involving ambiguities in the invocation of linguistic
methods in the empirical study of law: the first centers on the
ambiguous meaning of legal “empiricism”; the second, on the
ambiguous relationship between legal words and legal actions. Corpus
1. Nor “[m]ade in Germany,” for that matter, although on this point Hamann and
Vogel certainly deserve a bit of poetic license. See Hanjo Hamann & Friedemann
Vogel, Evidence-Based Jurisprudence Meets Legal Linguistics—Unlikely Blends Made in Germany,
2017 BYU L. REV. 1473, 1473.
2. Five Questions for Nina Bandelj, ACCOUNTS (Am. Sociological Ass’n, Wash. D.C.),
July 2013, at 2, 3 (“I am a methodological omnivore, driven more by empirical questions than
by specific analytic methods.”).
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linguistics offers a powerful new tool for the study of law, but the
nature of its promise will depend in important ways on who embraces
it and how.
II. THE AMBIGUITY OF LINGUISTIC EMPIRICISM
To describe a piece of scholarship as “empirical” is to highlight or
assert the primacy of objective and systematic observation (or at least
of intendedly objective and systematic observation) as a warrant for
the scholar’s truth claims. Polemics, sermons, opinion pieces, and
philosophical treatises are nonempirical because their primary warrants
are passion, morality, authenticity, and logic, respectively, rather than
systematic observation. Surveys, tabulations, experiments, focus
groups, and ethnographies are all empirical because their primary
warrants are objectivity and systematicity—even though their
respective foci, methods, and epistemologies diverge quite radically.
As a shorthand, one could say that scholarship is empirical if the
scholar commits to a method of observation and a style of
argumentation that allows external reality to discomfit the scholar’s
prior expectations.
To understand the place of corpus linguistics in legal scholarship,
one must recognize that the corpus linguist aspires to be empirical,
whereas the traditional, doctrinal legal scholar does not. Even when a
linguist and a doctrinalist work from the same corpus of legal text, the
primary warrants that the two adduce will differ significantly. The
linguist commits (albeit perhaps only tacitly) to the methodological
premise that observation of a particular pattern in the text will warrant
a particular conclusion; the doctrinalist looks to the text for
inspiration, but ultimately warrants his or her argument on the basis
of morality, logic, or untested assumptions about policy impact—not
on the basis of objective and systematic observation. A linguistic
argument is “correct” when it is borne out by observed patterns in
the corpus; a doctrinal argument can be “correct” even if the corpus
is silent, divided, or uniformly wrongheaded—indeed, those are
precisely the conditions under which the doctrinalist’s skills may be
most needed.
As sharp as this distinction between empiricism and doctrinalism
may seem in principle, however, the dividing lines often become much
hazier in practice—especially for legal scholars working from legal
1753
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texts. Doctrinal legal scholars often summarize and synthesize a corpus
of prior texts, at least to contextualize other less empirical modes of
argumentation; and empirical legal scholars often explore doctrinal
implications, at least to motivate particular systematic observations.
Legal corpus linguistics necessarily occupies this twilight zone, and to
avoid misunderstandings, legal corpus linguists must give careful
consideration to the ways in which their enterprise is (or is
not) “empirical.”
A. Corpus Linguistics as Empirical Method
The first and perhaps easiest question is methodological: If
empiricism requires objective and systematic observation, then how
should legal corpus linguists observe? Here, Hamann and Vogel
faithfully capture the spirit of the present symposium when they assert
that “[m]ethodologically, [corpus research in law] relies on big data
empiricism.” 3 In the interest of brevity, I will not belabor this point,
except to note that quantitative, computation-intensive “big data
empiricism” is not the only empirical method for observing legal
language. Some individual texts may have attributes that are
qualitatively revealing despite being quantitatively rare. Some
quantitative patterns become more interesting when juxtaposed with
qualitative evidence on a particular historical period or social
community. And some linguistic “big data” become interpretable only
when linked, through demographic or geographic metadata, with
other data sources, big and small. So, although academic politics may
push legal linguists to embrace the cachet of big data empiricism,
scholarly rigor cautions against fetishizing the computational analysis
of large corpora to the exclusion of other complementary
empirical methods.
B. Corpus Linguistics as Empirical Subject
A harder definitional question is substantive: If empiricism
requires objective and systematic observation, then what should legal
corpus linguists observe? The obvious answer, as Hamann and Vogel
assert, is legal language—treated “not merely as the medium but as
3. Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1474.
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the object of study.” 4 But this answer can be no more than partial.
Even if one accepts, arguendo, Hamann and Vogel’s claim that “[w]e
cannot speak about legal norms without thinking about how they are
constructed by and through speech and texts,” 5 one must also take
seriously the injunction from Legal Fact Research that “two sets of
facts are to be taken into account: the life situations to be regulated,
and the politics and valuations guiding the regulating activities”; and
that, “[t]o know them both, the jurist must put himself outside of the
body of the existing rules.” 6 In other words, for many interesting and
important empirical questions about law, the study of legal language,
in itself, may not be enough.
To get a fuller sense of what else legal linguists might observe,
consider the following simple typology of causes and effects:
Table 1: A typology of legal and extra-legal processes in language
Cause:
Law world
Social World

Effect: Law world
1: Autopoietic Law
3: Legal Politics

Social World 7
2: Legal Impact
4: Informal Norms

4. Id.
5. Id. at [114].
6. Id. at [104] (quoting Max Rheinstein, Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in
Germany, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 232, 253 (1935) (emphasis added)).
7. I use the label “social world” as shorthand for those aspects of social life that occur
largely outside formal legal institutions—whether in spontaneous daily interactions or in such
extra-legal institutional spheres as business, medicine, or politics. This domain of extra-legal
social activity is approximately equivalent to what German social philosophers would
call “lebenswelt,” or the “lifeworld.” See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: VOLUME TWO: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF
FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1981); EDMUND
HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
(David Carr trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1970) (1954). Elsewhere in the social sciences, it
carries such labels as “civil society” and “everyday life.” See, e.g., JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW
ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1994); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). Of course, this distinction between a “law world”
and a “social world” should not obscure the fact that formal legal institutions are themselves
social. Nor should it obscure the fact that extra-legal social life is inevitably shaped and
constituted by law. Nonetheless, the distinction is often analytically useful (and for most people
intuitively obvious), because the law world is effectively bounded and demarcated from the extralegal social world by linguistic barriers and credentialing requirements that can be bridged only
via substantial investments in translation and re-presentation. Cf. AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW
APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988).
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In Cell 1, we find the core domain of Computer Assisted Legal
Linguistics (CAL2), as Hamann and Vogel have defined it:
“[A]nalyz[ing] what judges and other jurists write down and how they
thus exert power and authority” 8 or, somewhat more broadly,
“studying quantitatively how lawyers create and apply legal rules by
‘treating doctrine as a quantitative unit.’” 9 Significantly, even within
this “autopoietic” 10 heartland, “[g]aps remain” 11—perhaps most
significantly in studying legal language outside the publicly
documented context of litigation, in the more occluded precincts of
contractual drafting, statutory and regulatory rulemaking, corporate
compliance activities, and alternative dispute resolution.
However, the other cells of the table suggest an even broader array
of empirical objects that legal corpus linguistics might encompass: In
Cell 3, we have Nussbaum’s “systematic search into the social, political
and other fact conditions which give rise to the individual legal
rules” 12; and in Cell 2, his “examination of the social, political and
other effects of those rules.” 13 The former is the domain of political
scientists in the Law and Society movement, as well as of their
forebears in the Legal Realist tradition; the latter is the domain of
policy scholars in the Empirical Legal Studies movement, and also of
their forebears in the older tradition of Sociological Jurisprudence.
Cell 4, the most remote from traditional legal scholarship, is
nonetheless quite familiar to legal anthropologists and sociologists who study “private [normative] ordering,” 14 “[lay] legal

8. Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1494.
9. Id. at 1482 (quoting Bernard Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex System: An Empirical
Study of Valuation in Business Bankruptcy Cases, 53 UCLA L. REV. 357, 363 (2005)).
10. Id. at 1488; see also AUTOPOIETIC LAW, supra note 7.
11. Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1490.
12. Id. at 1477 (quoting Arthur Nussbaum, Fact Research in Law, 40 COLUM. L. REV.
189, 197 (1940)).
13. Id.
14. E.g., Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous
Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 23 (1981); see also, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
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consciousness,” 15 and “informal dispute resolution.” 16 Although these
three cells rarely generate well-archived corpora of explicitly legal text,
all three are certainly relevant to the empirical study of legal language.
Most importantly, Cells 2 and 3 foreground the process of translation
between legal and extra-legal institutions, while Cell 4 (juxtaposed
against Cell 1) highlights the sociolinguistic forces that can push the
law world and the social world out of alignment. 17 So, although
practical logistics may tempt legal linguists to embrace the
convenience of purely judicial corpora, scholarly rigor cautions against
fetishizing the language of the courtroom to the exclusion of other
complementary discourses. 18
C. Corpus Linguistics as Empirical Purpose
A third definitional question for linguistic empiricism is
motivational: in deciding how and what to observe, legal corpus
linguists should also ask why (and to whom) such observations would
be of interest. As Hamann and Vogel note, “Doctrinal analysis remains
the mainstay of . . . legal academia, so empirical research strands are
rarely perceived (let alone absorbed) by the field’s core authorities.” 19
To alter this state of affairs, legal empiricists either must focus their
15. E.g., PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES
EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN:
LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990); Susan S. Silbey, After
Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 323 (2005).
16. E.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court:
Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 941, 949–53
(1999); Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute
Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 777, 777–81 (1994).
17. These empirical problematics are important, but hardly new: The pioneering legal
anthropologist Paul Bohannan would have recognized tensions along the 1–4 diagonal as
instances of law being “out of phase with society,” and cycles along the 2–3 diagonal as processes
of “double institutionalization.” Paul Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST, Dec. 1965, at 33, 34–37.
18. Several pieces in this symposium tacitly embrace this prescription, usefully comparing
legal corpora to corpora drawn from other domains. Indeed, the necessity of such comparison
lies at the heart of the call for applying corpus linguistics to questions of “original public
meaning” in constitutional and statutory interpretation. See, e.g., James C. Phillips, Daniel
M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to
Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 Y ALE L.J.F. 21, 29 (2016) (“[A] general corpus could
confirm that a word or phrase is a legal term of art by showing that its ordinary meaning differs
from its meaning in legal sources.”).
19. Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1491.
FROM
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empirical methods on questions of doctrinal relevance or must
enunciate new scholarly questions that are sufficiently compelling to
carve a nondoctrinal enclave within or alongside the legal academy.
The former has been the favored strategy of the Empirical Legal
Studies movement; the latter, the strategy of Law and Society scholars
in the social science disciplines. 20 Either approach, however, demands
a clear-eyed recognition of the differences among several common
empirical modes: the descriptive, the configurational, the interpretive,
and the causal.
The simplest mode and motive for empirical research is raw
description: X occurs ten percent of the time; Y occurs twenty-five
percent of the time, etc. Unfortunately, however, raw description is a
thin gruel, and those who peddle it are derided as “crass
empiricist[s]” 21 for good reason. At the dawn of a new methodology,
such unstructured fact-inventories may have a certain appeal, as
anyone who has ever introduced a preschooler to a magnifying glass
will attest; but to transmute a collection of empirical observations into
a body of empirical knowledge requires both an organizing conceptual
framework and a purposeful investment in synthesis.
Thus, a second mode of empiricism might be termed
configurational 22—seeking to discern and characterize recurring
patterns or configurations in a body of empirical observations. Much
of computational corpus linguistics, including topic modeling and
colocation analysis, is configurational in this sense (as is personality
typing in psychology, social network mapping in sociology,
morphometric taxonomy in biology, and bit-string fingerprinting in
pharmacology). Significantly, as Hamann and Vogel note, legal
20. See Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, Toward a New Legal Empiricism:
Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 555 (2010).
21. William Outhwaite, Naturalisms and Anti-Naturalisms, in KNOWING THE SOCIAL
WORLD 22, 35 (Tim May & Malcolm Williams eds., 1998).
22. The label “configurational analysis” has emerged largely independently (and with
somewhat disparate meanings) in several distinct fields of scholarship. Here, I use it generically,
to refer simply to the empirical identification of recurrent patterns; but this usage maps only
loosely onto the terminology of any particular disciplinary tradition. See, e.g., Alan D. Meyer,
Anne S. Tsui & C. R. Hinings, Configurational Approaches to Organizational Analysis, 36
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1175 (1993); Earl S. Schaefer, A Configurational Analysis of Children’s Reports
of Parent Behavior, 29 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 552 (1965); Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik
Cederman & Brian Min, Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a
New Global Data Set, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 316 (2009).
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linguistics in this configurational mode can be qualitative as well as
quantitative, encompassing small-N methods such as hermeneutics,
discourse analysis, and linguistic ethnography, as well as large-N
methods of “calculating recurrent speech patterns . . . using big data
and semi-automated algorithms.” 23 As an empirical agenda, these
configurational approaches seek to problematize the familiar, revealing
hidden regularities in texts that have hitherto been studied only for
their argumentation, not their semantics. The patterns that emerge
can then be sorted into typologies and their incidence can be mapped
and theorized over time or across social and geographic space.
Whereas configurational analysis seeks to problematize the
familiar, a third empirical mode, interpretation, seeks to familiarize the
problematic. Most closely associated with the humanities and the
“humanistic social sciences,” 24 interpretation is a common agenda in
any field that takes culture (including linguistic culture) seriously. At
its core, interpretation attempts to explore and clarify the meaning in
social “texts”—broadly defined to include not only formal writings,
artistic works, and staged performances, but also informal speech acts,
visual displays, material artifacts, and customary practices. Given that
“meaning” is ultimately an introspective psychic construct, many
commentators dispute whether interpretive agendas qualify as
“empirical” at all, and legal empiricists are often quite explicit in
distinguishing their own preferred forms of scholarship from
traditional doctrinal interpretation. But this reaction conflates two
very different forms of interpretation: interpretation in the humanities
and interpretation in the social sciences.
Interpretative research in the humanities, like doctrinal
interpretation in law, is a largely nonempirical endeavor. The scholar
may begin with systematic observations (readings) of a text; but the
goal is less to capture an objective, external reality than to inspire and
provoke new resonances in the scholar’s own mind and in the minds

23. Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1493.
24. The modifier “humanistic” is often used to designate those social science
disciplines—including anthropology, history, and linguistics—that emphasize particularism
versus generalization, description versus abstraction, cultural contingency versus physical
determinism, empathetic understanding versus nomothetic prediction, and hence interpretivism
versus positivism. Cf. George Casper Homans, The Humanities and the Social Sciences, AM.
BEHAV. SCIENTIST, Apr. 1961, at 3, 3.
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of his or her interpretive interlocutors. In this humanistic mode, there
is no “wrong” interpretation of Hamlet (or of the U.S. Constitution);
just more or less engaging ones.
In contrast, interpretive research in the social sciences is often
objective and systematic to the core. The goal here is to uncover the
“emic” 25 meaning of a particular text within a particular cultural
community in a way that members of that community would
recognize and endorse. In this latter mode, an interpretation is
“wrong” if it cannot be confirmed by other researchers studying the
same subject community with the same methods. Far from being
nonempirical, such interpretive research is essential to understanding
the recurring behavioral patterns of self-aware, culture-bearing human
subjects. Even such apparently objective descriptive statistics as the
race and gender ratios of a survey sample become empirically tractable
only after one resolves (by pre-testing or by assumption) the
inherently interpretive issue of what the relevant questionnaire items
meant to the survey respondents. And interpretive empiricism is all
the more necessary when attention turns to the intendedly meaningful
texts produced and received by shifting discourse communities over
protracted periods of time. Indeed, for many legal linguists,
interpretive empiricism may be the main event, not a mere warmup act.
Despite the importance and difficulty of configurational and
interpretive empiricism, many researchers aspire to a fourth, even
more demanding mode of analysis, seeking to use objective, systematic
observation to resolve questions of causality. Causal claims take the
form “if X, then Y”—or, more forcefully, “because of X, therefore
Y”—and causal empiricism seeks to test such propositions by
observing how various Xs (independent variables) correlate with
various Ys (dependent variables); preferably under statistically or
experimentally controlled conditions that rule out various prior,
mediating, coincidental, or reciprocal factors. Taken literally, this goal
is more daunting than it might initially seem: the more science learns
about quantum uncertainty, physio-psycho-social over-determination,
and macro-historical path dependence, the more philosophers debate

25. Anthropologists traditionally distinguish between the emic understandings held by
research subjects and the etic explanations offered by outside scholars. See Marvin Harris, History
and Significance of the Emic/Etic Distinction, 5 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 329 (1976).
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whether causal propositions are ontologically meaningful and
epistemologically knowable even in principle, let alone technically
resolvable in practice. Nonetheless, humans seem predisposed to
understand the world in causal terms, and empirical researchers
routinely and unreflectively slip into the causal register even when
neither the available methods nor the available data merit such
presumptions. Currently, legal corpus linguistics seems somewhat less
susceptible to this temptation than other empirical approaches that get
less mileage out of uncovering novel configurations and interpreting
shrouded meanings; but as the field’s methods and data mature, its
causal ambitions may grow as well. Hamann and Vogel posit that
“legal norms . . . are constructed by and through speech and texts,” 26
and they envision an agenda for CAL2 that “analyzes what judges and
other jurists write down and how they thus exert power and
authority.” 27 These are causal claims about the force of words. To test
such claims empirically, legal corpus linguists will need to address
philosophical and methodological challenges that go well beyond
anything attempted to date. 28
III. THE AMBIGUITY OF LINGUISTIC CAUSATION
Although I do not propose to resolve the causal ambiguities of
corpus linguistics here, a brief illustration of one central puzzle may
26. Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1486 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 1494 (emphasis added).
28. For a more concrete illustration of how our four empirical purposes differ, consider
an imaginary traffic planner who arrives in the United States from a distant country. Walking the
streets, she observes various plaques, mounted in various ways, and bearing various markings.
Operating in the descriptive mode, she begins to record her observations in a notebook, perhaps
using categories based on the (possibly irrelevant) practices of her native land. After a while of
this, she switches to the configurational mode, noting that one particular pattern seems to recur
more often than others—an octagonal plaque, painted red, bearing the white markings “STOP.”
Perhaps this is a culturally meaningful symbol, she thinks. So, slipping into the interpretive mode
(and miraculously developing a fluency in spoken English), she begins to ask passersby what this
configuration means to them. Most describe it as a stop sign, and some go on to explain the
legal and normative implications. But our intrepid heroine understands the difference between
beliefs and behaviors; and she knows that in her homeland, traffic regulations are often widely
publicized, but equally widely violated. So, to round out her empirical project, she turns to the
causal mode, designing a series of experiments to determine the effects of such signage on
American motorists of various ages and genders, under various traffic conditions, at various times
of day, and in various stages of inebriation. No single element of this imaginary research design
would generate much knowledge on its own; however, skillfully conjoined, they might yield an
empirical understanding of American traffic patterns that would surpass the lay intuitions of even
a lifelong American driver.
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help to demonstrate the magnitude and importance of the challenge.
Specifically, any evenhanded approach to legal empiricism must
acknowledge that what we commonly call “the Law” is neither
exclusively a corpus of disembodied texts (constitutions, statutes,
judicial opinions, etc.) nor exclusively a system of embodied practices
(legislating, policing, litigating, adjudicating, punishing, etc.). Rather,
Law is a complex institutional amalgam, blending words and actions
in multiple causal (and noncausal) concoctions.
To grasp the implications for legal linguistics, consider a second
simple typology of causes and effects:
Table 2: A typology of linguistic and nonlinguistic processes
in law
Cause:

Effect: Actions

Words

Actions

1: Realism

2: Performances

Words

3: Performatives

4: Textualism

In Cell 1, we find the core domain of Legal Realism (and of many
more recent social-scientific approaches to the study of law) where the
focus falls not on what legal language says “in books” but on what
legal institutions do “in action.” 29 In Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous
dictum, “If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look
at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which
such knowledge enables him to predict.” 30 To Holmes and his fellow
Realists, an excessive focus on legal “phraseology,” “language,”
“talk[],” and “words” invites us “to drop into fallacy.” 31 “[I]f we take
the view of our friend the bad man we shall find that he does not care
two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to
know what the . . . courts are likely to do in fact.” 32 Although
29. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
30. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., Address at the
New Hall of the Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law: The Path of the Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 110 HARV. L.
REV. 991, 993 (1997).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 994.
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Holmes’s somewhat dogmatic presentation elides important aspects
of real-world human psychology and organizational behavior, it stands
as an important reminder that some aspects of law—the police officer’s
baton, the lawyer’s bill, the defendant’s race, the prison’s zip code—
do not “live[] in language.” Many respected researchers have devoted
their careers to producing empirical knowledge about legal
phenomena that have very little to do with “speech and texts,” 33 and
it is almost impossible to imagine a linguistic research design that
could support causal claims about the impact of legal text without
controlling for such nontextual pathways.
This cautionary note is particularly important for linguists who
purport to operate in Cell 4, examining the causal effects of particular
textual patterns on other textual patterns. The big-data computational
cachet of corpus linguistics encourages relatively bold leaps from
correlational data about the co-occurrence of words to causal
assertions about the force of words. But sometimes words are
epiphenomena, mere garnishes on outcomes that are predetermined
by other nonlinguistic factors. If an antidiscrimination statute says that
physical abilities may not be used as hiring criteria unless they are “jobrelated for the position in question and . . . consistent with business
necessity,” 34 then regulatory guidance documents, employee
handbooks, and applicant rejection letters may also begin to use the
phrase “job-related and consistent with business necessity” 35; but this
may tell us almost nothing about changes in actual hiring and
enforcement patterns or in cultural understandings of what constitutes
a valid job requirement or a viable business model. Indeed, it may not
even tell us whether the statutory change sparked the other
documentary changes, or whether instead the legislative use of “jobrelated and consistent with business necessity” simply encapsulated an
understanding that had already emerged in political protests, labor
negotiations, and out-of-court legal settlements, before being
verbalized in law. Certainly, textualist causation, of the sort envisioned
by Cell 4, does sometimes occur; but legal empiricists may vastly

33. Contra Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at [114].
34. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2012).
35. See, e.g., Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical
Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), EEOC Notice
No. 915.002 (July 27, 2000).
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overstate its frequency and importance if they become so enamored of
linguistic corpora that they lose sight of the other cells in the table.
In all fairness, this cautionary note also works the other way
around, and the Hamann and Vogel article, along with the rest of this
symposium, should usefully alert conventional Cell 1 scholars to the
possibility of textual causation—as well as to the ability of corpus
linguistics to illuminate such causation. Significantly, the potential for
productive dialog between conventional legal empiricists and
linguistic legal empiricists may be greatest, not in Cell 1 (where
linguists’ skills may strike nonlinguists as unnecessary) nor in Cell 4
(where linguists’ findings may strike nonlinguists as inconsequential),
but rather in Cells 2 and 3, where words and actions intertwine.
In Cell 2, we find words as performances—scripted or improvised
displays that flow from nonverbal events. At the extreme stand
exclamations: the verbal “Ouch!” that follows a physical hammer
striking a physical thumb. But of greater research interest are the
verbal accounts that people provide for their actions, 36 and the verbal
narratives that people construct around their experiences. 37 For
obvious reasons, such accounts and narratives play a crucial role in
interpretive inquiries into the emic meaning of nonverbal events.
More subtly, accounts and narratives also play an important role in
tracing how meanings emerge and propagate within a community—
and for understanding how extra-legal injuries evolve into private legal
disputes and public political movements, which in turn evolve into
public policies and, thence, into new legal regimes. 38
Finally, in Cell 3, we find processes in which “the textual work of
lawyers [should be] taken seriously and analyzed . . . as a . . .
performative speech act.” 39 Performative texts neither merely evoke
textual responses (as in Cell 4) nor merely describe states of the world
(as in Cell 2) but rather call into existence new states of the world,
36. Courtroom testimony is an obvious example, but account-formation is a fundamental
social process that occurs in innumerable nonlegal settings as well. Marvin B. Scott & Stanford
M. Lyman, Accounts, 33 AM. SOC. REV. 46 (1968).
37. Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a
Sociology of Narrative, 29 L. & SOC’Y REV. 197 (1995).
38. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980).
2
39. Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1494 (distinguishing CAL from both traditional
doctrinal analysis and traditional Legal Realism).
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conditioned on the textual utterance. The archetype is the
pronouncement of guilt, an utterance that instantaneously transmutes
a defendant into a convict. 40 Other legal performatives are less
celebrated but perhaps even more consequential: the definition that
divides a previously undifferentiated extra-legal category into the
legally sacred and the legally profane; the ruling that transfers the
burden of proof from plaintiff to defendant; the subtle linguistic
signaling that makes one phrase into a holding of law and another into
mere obiter dicta; the opinion-of-counsel letter that makes a desultory
background-check into “due diligence.” Indeed, a large amount of
traditional doctrinal scholarship involves efforts (albeit usually
nonempirical) to identify which legal utterances are performative and
which are not.
Arguably, as Hamann and Vogel suggest, Cell 3 may be the
domain in which corpus linguistics has the most to offer to empirical
legal scholarship. Legal performatives have real-world causal force, yet
they are rarely captured by traditional social science methodologies.
In making such utterances objectively and systematically observable,
corpus linguistics brings them within the perceptorium of legal
empiricism and hence within the scope of socio-legal analysis.
Nonetheless, much hard conceptual and methodological work
remains to be done. In particular, performances and performatives
often intertwine with one another and with the institutionalized
practices that they accompany. Few would deny that legal institutions
exhibit an elective affinity with performative speech, but we currently
lack a strong theory of when and why legal causation works through
such words—and when and why, instead, it works through the
nonverbal devices of space and time and wealth and force.
IV. THE AMBIGUOUS PROMISE OF LEGAL CORPUS LINGUISTICS
Hamann and Vogel describe CAL2 as aspiring to become “a new
transdiscipline, combining big-data corpus research with its own
epistemological focus on the language of legal practice, distinct from
the plain meaning and original intent traditions.” 41 This is a

40. It is interesting, in this context, to note that whereas jurors “announce” a verdict,
performing a speech ritual that merely reports prior deliberative actions, judges “pronounce” a
sentence, uttering performative words that invoke a new state of the world.
41. Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1475.
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commendably ambitious agenda. If only more legal scholars would
attempt such big things! However, Hamann and Vogel’s ambition can
be read in several distinct ways.
At times, they seem to envision CAL2 as a scholarly method for
better discerning the Law—that is, as an empirical toolkit for clarifying
legal concepts by revealing when and how particular terms and
constructions appear with one another or are used or avoided by
particular speakers. This resembles the use, illustrated elsewhere in this
symposium, of extra-legal corpora to assess “plain meaning” and
“original intent”; and Hamann and Vogel acknowledge that these
cognate American efforts “probably differ [from CAL2] more in their
source material (laypeople language vs. expert language) than in their
conceptual underpinning.” 42 Significantly, this distinctly scholarly
vision of legal corpus linguistics also resembles traditional doctrinal
legal scholarship—albeit with a fortifying infusion of big-data
empiricism. CAL2, American “public meaning” research, and
traditional doctrinalism all rest on the ontological premises that: (a)
legal language has a single true meaning, (b) this true meaning is
systematic enough to form an orderly conceptual structure, and (c)
this conceptual structure provides a useful normative foundation (or
at least a necessary degree of transparency and predictability) to guide
public policy. CAL2, “public meaning” linguistics, and doctrinalism
also all rest on the epistemological premise that the true meaning of a
legal text can be discerned by reading it in the light of other, related
texts. Admittedly, the three approaches differ in their views about
which types of texts one must include, how many texts one must
examine, and to what degree the examination must be statistical versus
impressionistic. 43 But these differences are no greater than the other
divisions of topic, ideology, and style that typically divide law faculties;
and peaceful coexistence—or even fruitful collaboration—seems
42. Id. at 1495.
43. To some degree, traditional doctrinalism also stands apart from corpus linguistics
2
(whether of the CAL or public-meaning variety) on the question of whether legal interpretation
can and should be made empirical rather than introspective. As suggested above, many
doctrinalists favor the humanistic variety of interpretivism, reading legal texts for subjective
inspiration and insight, rather than for objective evidence. Few such scholars would embrace the
proposition that corpus linguistics can render normative and philosophical matters empirical
simply by toting up the number of utterances on each side. Indeed, some might argue, who
needs doctrinal scholarship if majority usages are never wrong?
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easily achievable. In this vision, corpus linguistics represents what
business- strategy researchers would call a “competence-enhancing
technological discontinuit[y]” 44: different and valuable, yes; but
fundamentally disruptive, no.
At other times, however, Hamann and Vogel seem to envision
CAL2 as something more radical. Particularly when they link CAL2 to
the larger agenda of “evidence-based jurisprudence,” 45 they conjure
an image of law scholarship that would shift legal academia away from
its current affinity with moral philosophy, welfare economics, and
literary interpretation, toward a more “praxeological” 46 concern with
bottom-line lawyering. Hamann and Vogel posit that “[l]awyers like
doctors are interested in reality (only) insofar as their practical
decision-making requires.” 47 But the practical decision-making of
lawyers differs from that of doctors in a fundamental way: Doctors’
decisions confront an extrinsic physical reality that must be
understood empirically before it can be mastered clinically; lawyers’
decisions, in contrast, confront only the intrinsic socio-cultural reality
of legal institutions staffed by fellow legal professionals. Doctors cure
diseases; lawyers persuade colleagues. Given that legal persuasion is
heavily verbal, corpus linguistics could, in fact, prove to be a useful
legal tool; but in this more pragmatic vision, it would serve not the
scholarly agendas of truth and justice but the lawyerly agendas of
advocacy and effectuation. By determining empirically which word
combinations elicit which legal outcomes, practitioners could argue
more compellingly (or more performatively) toward any given ends
whether or not those ends were morally just, socially beneficent, or
logically coherent. 48 Using the label “Linguistic Legal Realism” and
44. Michael L. Tushman & Philip Anderson, Technological Discontinuities and
Organizational Environments, 31 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 439, 450 (1986).
45. Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1495.
46. Id. at 1484.
47. Id. (quoting Hanjo Hamann, EVIDENZBASIERTE JURISPRUDENZ: METHODEN
EMPIRISCHER FORSCHUNG UND IHR ERKENNTNISWERT FÜR DAS RECHT AM BEISPIEL DES
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS 7–8 (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2014) (Ger.)).
48. This, I take it, is what Hamann and Vogel mean by “a new corpus driven macro
perspective on the constitution of dogmatics—language, knowledge and power.” Id. at1495.
Significantly, they contrast this dogmatic agenda with earlier efforts to develop “electronic
brains” to generate “more objective, more predictable, more just and less complex legal decisionmaking.” Id. at 1494. In other words, whereas the earlier agenda sought to use legal corpora to
improve the overall health of the system (as assessed by extrinsic criteria, such as predictability
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citing Holmes’s Path of the Law, 49 Hamann and Vogel implicitly
acknowledge that this is a legal linguistics for the bad man: it cares less
about what legal words mean than about what they do. 50 Used in this
way, corpus linguistics would quite possibly represent a “competencedestroying” 51 discontinuity within the legal academy, elevating clinical
practice to new prominence while pushing doctrinal interpretation,
economic efficiency analysis, and moral philosophy to the margins.
V. CONCLUSION
In all honesty, I must confess that neither of these agendas holds
much appeal to me as an empirical sociologist. Nonetheless, legal
corpus linguistics holds a great deal of appeal for separate reasons of
my own.
I am skeptical about whether corpus linguistics can reveal the true
meaning of legal language because, in accord with the Legal Realists,
I am skeptical that language can ever have a single, stable, true
meaning, independent of particular speakers, particular audiences, and
the particular purposes of each. In a few very special cases, the speaker,
the audience, and the purpose may be so explicit and narrow that
something like a “plain meaning” becomes apparent; but most legal
words are uttered by multiple speakers to multiple audiences in
multiple contexts. As a result, multiple usages often enjoy substantial
currency alongside one another, and several of the most popular
usages are likely to have been familiar to both the speaker and the
audience(s) at the moment when the utterance was made. Moreover,
some of the most important utterances—constitutional compromises,
landmark legislation, breakthrough contracts—are intentionally
ambiguous, reflecting agreement on words but not on substance. In
and justice), the new agenda focuses on the more pragmatic project of determining how
practicing lawyers “succeed at convincing or out-writing opponents.” Id. at 1496.
49. Id. at 1494.
50. This characterization may be overly harsh. If one believes that skillful legal
representation generally leads to more just, predictable, or economically efficient outcomes, then
the use of linguistic evidence to improve lawyers’ skills may lead not only to direct benefits for
clients (who will, at least occasionally, be “bad men”), but also to indirect benefits for society as
a whole. The distinctive feature of the praxeological use of legal linguistics, however, is that it
gives top priority to improving lawyers’ rhetorical skills, while potentially de-emphasizing such
other skills as logical deduction, cost-benefit optimization, and ethical judgement.
51. Tushman & Anderson, supra note 44.
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effect, each party implicitly gambles that the chosen verbal formula
will eventually be interpreted favorably to that party’s interests by
some unknown third-party audience at some unknown future date. 52
Corpus linguistics may still be useful for determining “plain meaning”
in such cases—but only after a prior determination (by ideology or by
power) that certain speakers, audiences, contexts, and usages are
relevant, while others are not. As a sociologist, that prior
determination strikes me as the socio-legally interesting moment, after
which the findings of the corpus analysis will be largely predetermined.
I am equally skeptical of Hamann and Vogel’s more radical
“praxeological” agenda, albeit on quite different grounds. First, I am
skeptical that the causal efficacy of legal words can be gleaned from a
research agenda that confines itself to Cell 1 in Table 1’s typology of
legal and extra-legal processes (Law  Law) and Cell 4 in Table 2’s
typology of linguistic and nonlinguistic processes (Text  Text).
Although I do not deny the causal potential of legal words, I doubt
that the actual impact of legal words can be accurately gauged without
controlling for confounding variables in the nontextual aspects of law
and the nonlegal aspects of social life. Second, I think that Hamann
and Vogel underestimate the reflexivity of legal practice. Legal words
are not a chemical vaccine operating on insentient microbes 53; they are
communicative devices carrying both ostensible meanings and
subtextual signals. Even if corpus linguistics succeeds in identifying
distinctively efficacious utterances in prior legal speech, there is no
guarantee that those utterances will remain efficacious in the same way
and to the same degree once their distinctive efficacy becomes widely
known and disingenuously exploited. Teaching shepherds to cry
“wolf” may seem like a useful lesson, but only until a corpus linguist
comes along to reveal how efficacious that utterance is even in the
absence of actual wolves. Third, as a social scientist with no
professional obligation to train legal practitioners, I am not overly
excited about the project of teaching lawyers how to select the most
efficacious power words, especially if this comes at the expense of
teaching them how to recognize and promote just and orderly social
52. See, e.g., JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 133–61 (1989); Vicki Eaton Baier, James G. March & Harald
Saetren, Implementation and Ambiguity, 2 SCANDINAVIAN J. MGMT. STUD. 197 (1986).
53. Cf. ROBERT L. KIDDER, CONNECTING LAW AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
RESEARCH AND THEORY 112–43 (1983) (critiquing a “vaccine model” of legal impact).
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arrangements—or at least how to recognize the scope and limits of
power words in the face of other less loquacious social forces. In short,
although I can imagine standing apart from this praxeological
enterprise and analyzing its progress as a study in the sociology of
knowledge, I cannot imagine embracing its agenda as my own.
Instead, my enthusiasm for legal corpus linguistics rests on very
different disciplinary grounds. To me, legal documents and the
corpora composed of them are intriguing as social artifacts—the
intentional products of particular social communities at particular
times. 54 As such, they provide a cultural window into the past, and
their variations across time and place provide a fossil record of sociolegal change. Admittedly, words-as-artifacts are often harder to
interpret than either objects-as-artifacts or words-as-text: Beneath
their communicative plain meaning, documentary artifacts may have
both performative technical properties and symbolic subtextual
resonances. And the same document may serve different purposes in
different communities: having one role for the private individuals who
crafted it; other roles for the various publics who stand before it as
subjects or view it from afar as spectators; and yet other roles for
the specialized professionals who bear responsibility for its
implementation, curation, modification, and diffusion. Nonetheless,
legal corpora provide unparalleled opportunities for big-data, longuedurée 55 cultural analysis. Cross-sectionally, we can compare them to
other contemporaneous corpora from literature, politics, science, or
other domains; longitudinally, we can trace their evolution as the legal
community expands, matures, and professionalizes. They may never
tell us the “true” meaning of the Law, and they may never generate a
comprehensive how-to manual for efficacious legal speech; but they
may certainly shed empirical light on our social world and on the
political, cultural, psychological, and economic forces that make
it run.
In the end, however, the empirical value of legal corpora may
depend less on methodological ambition than on methodological
humility. Legal corpora seem destined to become a useful and versatile
54.
55.

Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 91 (2003).
Fernand Braudel, Histoire et Sciences Sociales: La Longue Durée, 13 ANNALES.
ÉCONOMIES, SOCIÉTÉS, CIVILISATIONS 725 (1958) (Fr.) (arguing that historians should analyze
long-term shifts and continuities in social structure, rather than merely chronicle salient but
fleeting historical events).
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tool in the social-scientific toolkit; but in themselves, they can never
be a panacea. To understand society empirically through legal
linguistics, we must pursue linguistic empiricism in all its registers—
descriptive, configurational, interpretive, and causal. We must also
couple empirical knowledge about legal linguistics with empirical
knowledge about the many other, nonlinguistic aspects of law and of
legal institutions. And, perhaps most importantly, we must couple
empirical knowledge about law in all its aspects with commensurately
deep and subtle empirical knowledge about the other facets of social
life. For socio-legal empiricists, “law and society” must always be a
conjunction, not a mere intersection. Nothing in legal corpus
linguistics changes this fundamental truth.
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